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Dowler: Pregnancy and Hiring Discrimination

PREGNANCY AND HIRING DISCRIMINATION
The employer looks over the application on his desk. The applicant has the right educational requirements; her references
are impressive; she has experience which would greatly benefit
her in the position. She looks like a good prospect. The employer
buzzes his secretary and requests that the applicant be shown to
his office for an interview. As the applicant enters the room he
rises to meet her. Half way out of his chair he stops. Printed on
the front of the woman's shirt are the letters B-A-B-Y with an
arrow pointing down to the slight bulge at the woman's
stomach. Politely introducing himself, the employer tells the
woman that there are no positions available for her at this time.
He ushers her out the door, promising to call her if something
should open up for which she is qualified.
Is this discrimination? The answer is a qualified yes.
In the past decade, the courts have been active in the area
of gender-based discrimination. Using the protections afforded
by the Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641
and other statutes, the courts have increased the number of actions considered discriminatory while limiting the acceptable
reasons for not hiring women. In this context, the courts have
occasionally reviewed allegations of pregnancy discrimination.
However, the area has proved more troublesome to the courts 2
than non-pregnancy discrimination because pregnant women
who work have traditionally been regarded as endangering their
lives and the lives of their babies. Further, the uniqueness of
pregnancy causes problems for the courts; pregnancy only affects women; it is a disability without being an illness; it has an
aspect of voluntariness that other disabilities do not.
In some cases, the charges have been that women were fired
or lost benefits because they became pregnant. In others,
women claimed they were not hired solely because they were
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
'See Comment, Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Employment- The
Impact of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 13
HARV. Civ. RIGHTS L. REV. 717 (1978), for a discussion of the tendency of courts to
use stereotypical images of women and pregnancy.
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women. Only a few cases have been brought in which a woman
claimed she was not hired because she was pregnant. As more
and more women choose to have both a career and a family, it
seems probable that "failure to hire due to pregnancy" cases
will become common. This note will explore the rights of both
the potential employer and the pregnant applicant.
Initially, the prohibitions against discrimination and the
defenses available to the employer will be examined. Next, the
cases involving pregnancy discrimination will be reviewed in
depth. Although none of these cases involve the hiring of pregnant women, the courts' attitudes toward pregnancy can be determined. Finally, the holdings from these cases will be compared to holdings from hiring discrimination cases to see if some
guidelines can be developed for the employer who is faced with
a pregnant applicant.
I. THE PROHIBITION AGAINST SEX DISCRIMINATION
A. The Constitution
Sex discrimination is prohibited, at least to some extent,
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. When examining sex discrimination cases, courts frequently use the deferential rational basis
standard to review legislative determinations concerning government activity or the classification of groups.
Early sex discrimination cases were reviewed under the rational basis test and the results were often less than satisfactory.3 The courts tended to be paternalistic in their approach
I For example, in Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912), the Court
upheld a laundry license statute which differentiated between steam and hand
laundries and excepted women if less than two were employed. The Court stated,
"If Montana deems it advisable to put a lighter burden upon women than upon
men with regard to an employment that our people commonly regard as more appropriate for the former, the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere by
creating a fictituous equality where there is real difference." Id. at 62. And in
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), a case involving exemption of women from

jury duty, the Court said it could not conclude the statute was not based on a
reasonable classification. It further held it was not constitutionally impermissible
for a state to allow a woman to be relieved of the "civic duty of jury service
unless she herself determines that such service is consistent with her own special
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and, because almost any statute can be found to have a rational
basis and any classification can be rationally related to the purpose of the statute, little legislation was struck down.
However, in the early 1970's the courts began to scrutinize
states' activities more closely, importing notions from other
areas of due process and equal protection into sex cases.' From
due process the courts imported the right of privacy as it relates
to marriage and childbearing as first set forth in the landmark
decisions of Griswold v. Connecticut5 and Roe v. Wade.' In
Griswold, the Court determined that the state had no interest in
prohibiting a couple's decision to use contraceptives and could
not prosecute those who furnished information about birth control. Similarly, in Roe, the Court concluded that there was no
compelling state interest in protecting the life of an unborn
child, at least in the first trimester of pregnancy, and the interest was limited in the second trimester. By these decisions
and their progenies, the Court limited governmental interference into the areas of marriage and childbearing.
From equal protection, the United States Supreme Court
borrowed the idea that certain classifications -those based on
race, alienage and national origin-are suspect and as such are
subjected to strict scrutiny. Although the Court has consistently
declined to view sex as a suspect classification,7 it did heighten
the standard of review above mere rational basis to an intermediate "substantial relationship" test.
Thus the courts became more active in the area of gender-

responsibilities," pointing out the woman is still regarded as the "center of home
and family." Id. at 61.
See Molere v. Southeastern Louisiana College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La.
1969); Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184
(E.D. Va. 1970).
5 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the court held "that
classifications based on sex, like classifications based on race, alienage, or national
origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny." Id. at 688. Despite this, the Court in subsequent cases did not elevate
sex to a suspect classification and it declined to apply the strict scrutiny standard
of review.
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based discrimination and struck down statutes not meeting the
new stricter standards.
Because educational institutions were excluded from
coverage under Title VII until 1972, sex discrimination claims by
school teachers were constitutionally based. The landmark case
involving pregnancy and due process is Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur8 decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1974. There, the Court struck down Ohio and Virginia
school districts' mandatory leave policies requiring teachers to
quit work in the fourth and fifth months of pregnancy.
The school boards in both districts claimed the policies were
necessary to preserve continuity of classroom instruction and to
facilitate the finding of qualified substitutes. The school boards
also pointed out that some teachers became incapable of performing their duties. The Court held that an arbitrary cut off
date had no rational relation to a valid state interest in preserving continuity of instruction. Further, the Court noted that such
a rule created an irrebutable presumption that all pregnant
teachers were physically incapable of teaching after their fourth
or fifth month and as such swept too broadly. The mandatory
leave policies created an unjustifiable burden on the freedom of
choice in matters of family life.
However, the LaFleur decision did not hold that any regulation of maternity leave is impermissible. In a footnote,' the
Court hinted that it might be reasonable to require leave in the
final weeks of pregnancy. Although LaFleur was decided on due
process grounds, it was originally viewed as an equal protection
case, and in fact later cases10 have held that the due process irrebutable presumption analysis used in LaFleur is actually an
equal protection analysis.
A case similar to LaFleur also involving pregnant teachers,
is Heath v. Westerville.1 In Heath, a federal district court held
that classification on the basis of sex or pregnancy were not per
se violative of equal protection. However, the court struck down

414 U.S. 632 (1974).
Id. at 647 n.13.
II See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
I 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
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the mandatory leave policy as overinclusive because not all
pregnant women were incapacitated at the time they were required to quit. The court stated, "[a]ny rule by an employer that
seeks to deal with all pregnant employees in an identical fashion
is dehumanizing to the individual women involved and is by its
'12
very nature arbitrary and discriminatory.
A better solution, the court pointed out, would be to provide
a case-by-case determination of pregnant teachers' ability to perform their duties. Using this method, a policy requiring a woman
to quit when she can no longer perform adequately would be
permissible.
The holding that classification on the basis of pregnancy is
not per se violative of equal protection was upheld in Geduldig
v. Aiello."1 The Supreme Court refused to strike down a policy
which ruled women ineligible for unemployment disability payments when the disability resulted from pregnancy. The Court
determined that this was not sex discrimination, but rather a
legislative decision to cover disabilities it considered the most
acute. All risks were not covered by the plan and pregnancy was
merely an unincluded risk. Although the case involves the fundamental rights of childbearing and procreation, it can also be
classified as a social welfare case-an area where courts traditionally defer to legislative determinations as long as such determinations are rationally based."
Thus under due process and equal protection analysis, the
prohibitions against pregnancy discrimination are limited. The
courts are unwilling to go the final step and declare that the
government may not interfere or discourage the decision of a

1

Id. at 505.

's

417 U.S. 484 (1974).

If Geduldig were brought today, the results would be quite different. In
General Electric Company v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Supreme Court
upheld a case with the same facts as Geduldig but brought under Title VII.
However, the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes the decisions
of Geduldig and Gilbert obsolete as the Act specifically prohibits discrimination in
benefits. However, some argue that Gilbert is still valid in that it supplies "a
framework for determining instances of unlawful facial discrimination under Title
VII as amended:' Ostrer, GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert.Defining the Equal Opportunity Rights of Pregnant Workers, 10 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 605
(1979).
"
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woman to bear a child or may not classify groups on the basis of
pregnancy. Under LaFleur due process, it may be possible for
regulations to be enforced against a woman in her final weeks of
pregnancy if such rules are rationally supported. Under equal
protection, it is permissible to totally exclude pregnancy from
certain benefit plans, at least in the social welfare area. This
leaves some large gaps which are filled to some degree by Title
VII.
B.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin, or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.15
In 1978, President Carter signed into law the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act"' as an amendment to Title VII. This Act
makes it clear that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination:
The terms "because of sex" and "on the basis of sex" include
but are not limited to because or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(b) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise ....

"

17

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
Id.
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This Act severely limits any employment practice which
classifies groups into pregnant and non-pregnant employees.
Title VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).8 The Commission has the power to process
and investigate employment discrimination complaints and to
prosecute such actions in federal courts if necessary. 19 In this
capacity the EEOC has developed interpretations of Title VII
and issued statements concerning employment practices published in the Code of Federal Regulations. The courts have recognized the Commission's expertise in this area and generally
accord its opinion and interpretations great deference."
One area in which the EEOC has developed such a policy
statement is that of employment practices relating to pregnancy
and childbirth. The Commission states:
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice
which excludes from employment applicants or employees
because of pregnancy is in prima facie violation of Title
Vu.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, for all job related purposes, shall be treated the same as disabilities caused or
contributed to by other medical conditions, under any
health or temporary insurance or sick leave plan available
in connection with employment.2"
The Commission further declares that practices and policies concerning leave commencement and duration and payment under
any sick leave or insurance plan should be applied to pregnancy
to the same extent they are applied to other temporary disabilities.'
It is clear that pregnancy comes within the boundaries of Title VII and that an employer may not, without justification, discharge or refuse to hire a woman because she is pregnant.

, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-6 (1976).
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Rosen v. Public Serv.
Electric and Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973). But see General Electric Com-

pany v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
21 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1980).
2 Id.
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Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment, pregnancy must be treated by an employer as any other temporary disability. Pregnancy may not be singled out and given special
treatment. However, once a prima facie case of discrimination is
made, the employer may justify his decision to discharge or not
to hire a pregnant woman by raising one of the recognized defenses to sex discrimination."
II.
A.

THE DEFENSES TO SEX DISCRIMINATION
The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification

The bona fide occupational qualification is set out in Title
VII:
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of his religion,
sex or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise.'
The exception is interpreted narrowly by the EEOC. The
Commission has explained that the BFOQ exception cannot be
used to exclude women from employment based on stereotypical
characterizations or preferences of the employer, co-workers,
clients or customers.28
The BFOQ defense was created to allow facial classifications
if justified. The classic example of this is only hiring women to
play the female role in a theatrical production." The BFOQ has
many formulations. For example, in Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways' a BFOQ was found only where sex goes to the
essence of job performance. Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone
and Telegraph' stated that a BFOQ existed where an employer
I For a detailed analysis of this area of defenses see Comment, Sex Discrimination:Theories and Defenses Under Title VII and Burwell v. EasternAirlines,
Inc., 83 W. VA. L. REv. xxx (1981).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
" 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1980).
- Id. § 1604.2(a)(1).
Id. § 1604.2(a)(2).
1 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
2 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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had "a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the
duties of the job involved.""3 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.3
limited a BFOQ to where the generic sexual characteristics of
the employee were crucial to successful performance of the job.
Practically, there is little difference in the application of these
tests.
The Supreme Court, recognizing the different standards,
stated in Dothardv. Rawlinson,32 "[blut whatever the verbal formulation, the federal courts have agreed that it is impermissible
under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on

"3
the basis of stereotypical characterizations of the sexes ....

A type of sub-group often confused with BFOQ is the
"legitimate business purpose" defense to disparate treatment
cases. This defense was set out in McDonnellDouglas v. Green."
When a prima facie case is established the burden shifts to the
employer to show some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the refusal to hire the person. Discriminatory motive must be
proved, though in some cases it can be inferred.
B.

The Business Necessity Defense

The business necessity defense, which applies to disparate
impact, was first recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 5
Griggs defines disparate impact as those practices which are
facially neutral in treatment of different groups but actually
have a greater effect on one group. Motive need not be proved.
To come within the business necessity exception, a discriminatory practice must bear a manifest relationship to the employidea is more fully explained in Robinson v.
ment. This
38
Lorillard:
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate
business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe
Id. at 235.
444 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1971).
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
Id. at 332.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 1006 (1971).
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and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact, the challenged practice must effectively carry out the
business purpose it is alleged to serve and there must be
available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which
would better accomplish the business purpose advances, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.
Courts also look to the relationship between the practice
and successful job performance as well as the history of discriminatory practices. If the relationship is questionable or the
business has a history of discrimination, the defense may be
disallowed as a pretext.
These defenses are difficult for the employer to raise successfully. An employer must prove the practices are "necessary
to the operation of the business," or have a "manifest relation"
to the job or that "substantially all women are unable to perform the job safely and efficiently." The tests are meant to be
difficult to meet in order to insure that an employer does not
use the defenses as a pretext for discrimination. Whether the
BFOQ or the business necessity defense is used, the practice
must be vital to the business before it will be allowed.
Courts tend to blur the distinctions between the two
defenses, and, indeed, it is frequently difficult to differentiate
between them. For example, in Burwell v. Eastern Air.Lines,
Inc.17 the court stated that the airlines' mandatory leave policy
is facially neutral but discriminatory in impact. Thus it should
be tested by the business necessity defense. However, in most
of the cases involving mandatory leave problems, BFOQ was the
defense raised, either accompanied by the business necessity
test or alone. In many cases dealing with disparate treatment
the BFOQ defense will be raised, where the proper test should
be legitimate business purpose. The confusion results from the
similarity of terms "necessary to the business" in BFOQ for
facially discriminatory cases, business purpose for disparate
treatment cases, and business necessity for disparate impact
cases. Some courts have difficulty in determining whether some-

7 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). For an in-depth discussion of this case see
Comment, supra note 23.
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thing is discriminatory in treatment or in impact. The result is
that no strict rules are applied.
III.

DEVELOPING CASE LAW

A large portion of the case law on pregnancy deals with
employers who force women to take unpaid maternity leave at a
specified date regardless of the women's desire, ability or need
to work. At the forefront of this type of litigation were stewardnesses who had a strict leave policy enforced against them. Most
airlines required the flight attendant to quit work upon the
knowledge that she was pregnant. School teachers were also
largely affected by mandatory leave policies with schools often
requiring a teacher to quit in the middle of a term or refusing to
renew her contract.
Because teachers and stewardnesses have actively litigated
in this area, their decisions will be explored in depth to determine the courts' positions on leave policies and what the implications are for the future.
A.

Airline Cases

The airline companies are notorious for their discriminatory
practices. An early case involving the BFOQ defense is Diaz v.
PanAmerican World Airways, Inc.' In Diaz, a male applied for
the position of flight attendant and was rejected by the airline.
He then filed a sex discrimination action. The lower court
agreed with the airline that being female was a BFOQ for the
job of flight attendant. The court held that males did not perform as well in non-mechanical jobs such as providing reassurance to anxious passengers and giving courteous personalized
service. There was expert testimony adduced at trial, as follows:
Many male passengers would subconsciously resent a male
flight attendant perceived more masculine then they, but respond negatively to a male flight attendant perceived as less
masculine, where as male passengers would generally feel
themselves more masculine and thus more at ease in the
presence of a young female attendant.'

311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
Id. at 565-66 (emphasis added).
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The court concluded that few men had the aggregate personality needed for a flight attendant and that being a female was a
requirement reasonably designed to improve the average performance of a flight attendant. The case was reversed on appeal,'" the circuit court of appeals holding that discrimination is
allowed only when the essence of the business would be undermined by hiring both sexes. The court added that the primary
function of the airline is safe transportation and that providing a
pleasant atmosphere was "tangential" to that function.
With Diaz as an historical backdrop, airline employees
sought to attack the leave policies using some of the analyses
that Diaz set forth. Nearly all the major airlines have been involved in this type of litigation in a variety of jurisdictions,
though no dominant principle has emerged. Each court seems to
draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented.
Generally the mandatory leave policy does not apply to the
ground crew of an airline. However, when an airline did extend
its leave policy to the ground crew it was quickly struck down.
Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 1 determined that a mandatory
leave policy requiring ground crew members to quit work after
their fifth month of pregnancy was not justified under the BFOQ
exception. The airline failed to show that pregnant women were
not capable of working efficiently after their fifth month or that
the leave policy was reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the airline's business. In a similar decision, In re National
Airlines," the court also rejected a BFOQ defense for ground
crew members, provided a woman had medical certification that
she could perform her duties.
Different results have been found in the flight attendant
cases. A BFOQ was found in the case of Condit v. United Airlines.'" The United policy was that flight attendants were to quit
work immediately upon the knowledge of pregnancy, but no
medical examination was made to determine if the flight attendant was capable of doing her job. At trial, medical testimony
conflicted as to whether the stewardess could indeed perform
41 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).

,1 374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
,s 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 689 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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her duties, although all medical experts agreed that fatigue,
fainting, morning sickness, nausea and back strain were common
occurrences in pregnancy. Some evidence was presented which
showed that flying neither caused nor aggravated these symtoms. Other evidence showed that flying increased the risk of
spontaneous abortion during the first trimester. The court,
citing the safety of passengers as the airline's major concern,
concluded that United had shown the mandatory leave policy to
have a "manifest relationship" to the continuing employment of
pregnant flight attendants. Viewing the "total pregnancy picture" the court concluded United was justified in maintaining
the policy.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision, saying the BFOQ
ruling was based on finding of fact and that such a leave policy
was "consistent with a common carrier's duty to exercise the
highest degree of care for the safety of its passengers."'
Similar to Condit is the California case of Harriss v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc.'5 Pan Am cited four reasons why
its mandatory leave policy qualified for the BFOQ exception.
The first reason was that the complications of pregnancy would
hinder emergency performance. The airline cited fatigue, nausea
and vomiting, and spontaneous abortion as frequent occurrences
which are potentially disabling. Also increasing girth and the
disturbance of balance makes performing duties more difficult.
Medical testimony supported these contentions. The court concluded that on the basis of all the testimony Pan Am acted
"reasonably and prudently in considering the disabling consequences of pregnancy" when it formulated the plan.
The second reason Pan Am set out was the potential conflict
of interests in the pregnant flight attendant's duty to the passengers and the duty to her unborn fetus in an emergency. The
court agreed there was "good reason to infer" that the attendant might be hesitant or indecisive in performing her duties.
The third reason discussed was the conflict in medical opinion regarding the advisability of employing pregnant flight
attendants. Pan Am claimed that such a conflict favored a con-

It 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977).
, 437 F. Supp. 413 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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servative view and thus mandatory leave upon knowledge of
pregnancy. The court again acknowledged that the airline acted
"prudently."
Finally, Pan Am considered the availabilty of medical
assistance to the flight attendant should she need it. As some of
Pan Am's flights are 10 to 15 hours or longer, the court found
such a policy to be reasonable. Concluding, the court found the
mandatory policy was "based on judgments reached in good
faith and supported by facts demonstrating the operational and
safety problems that can arise from the presence of pregnant
flight attendants on board an aircraft.""
Pan American also claimed a business necessity defense.
The policy was necessary to the safe and efficient operation of
the business because (1) it was a good faith effort to protect the
safety of the passengers; (2) it was reasonably calculated to further safety objectives by removing a flight attendant whose condition posed an additional risk in emergencies; and (3) there was
no feasible alternative of lesser adverse impact because the major complications of pregnancy are unpredictable and there is no
way to project potential conflicts of interest. The court agreed,
concluding that the record supported such policy.
Delta Air Lines came under attack in EEOC v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc." In a brief opinion, the court merely stated that Condit and Harriss foreclosed any claim that mandatory maternity
leave was prohibited.
The airlines and the courts in the above decisions generally
ignored the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) stand on
such policies. The FAA has found that when a flight attendant is
pregnant and she is in good health with no complications, the
decision whether she could fly should be between the woman
and her doctor.48 One court did recognize this position. In
MacLennan v. American Airlines, Inc.," the court responded to
a claim that passenger safety would be jeopardized by allowing
pregnant flight attendants to remain on the job by stating, "the

' Id. at 425.
4' 441 F. Supp.

626 (S.M. Tex. 1977).
" See Condit v. United Airlines, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 689 (E.D. Va. 1976).
,9 440 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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importance of physical strength and capacity when attendilag to
these safety functions is minimized by the lack of health and
physical requirements imposed upon the flight attendants by
both the government agency charged with overseeing flight
safety-the Federal Aviation Administration -and the airline
itself." 0
The court considered the predictability, preventability, and
likelihood of a variety of ailments relating to pregnancy and the
extent to which they interfere with the ability to perform
duties. The court found that while some attendants did become
incapacitated, a substantial number were physically able to
work. The court further found the risk of disabilities in a normal
pregnancy was so remote as to be negligible, and that the ability
to continue work should de determined by the flight attendant,
her doctor and a medical representative of the airline, at least
until the 26th week of pregnancy. Decisions should be made on a
case-by-case basis and not by a generalized rule. After the 26th
week, the flight attendant may be required to go on leave.
In a number of these airlines cases, medical evidence
presented by the Mayo Clinic is cited. The findings of the clinic
were that, during the first trimester of pregnancy, the flight attendant can perform all her duties without difficulty. During the
second trimester, the ability to work varies from person to person. The clinic recommended that the flight attendant not work
during the final trimester." This policy was adopted by Northwestern Airlines which has avoided the deluge of litigation thus
far.
The Northwestern policy was cited in In re National Air
Lines (Gardnerv. National in response to National's BFOQ
argument. The airline claimed its mandatory leave policy was
necessary for the safety of the passengers, the fetus and the
flight attendant. The court rejected the argument concerning
the latter two, stating there was no convincing evidence of
danger. The evidence of an increase in spontaneous abortion
was conflicting. Northwestern, whose policy allows the attendant to continue working, gave evidence that "no fetal anomolies"
Id. at 471.
t See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1978).
434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
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had been observed in its employees. The court also reasoned
that the decision to risk harm to the fetus is one to be determined
by the mother.0 Thus the only proper consideration of the
airline is the safety of its passengers.
The court, in weighing the conflicting evidence to determine
if a BFOQ existed, set out a two-step test. The first step was the
test of Diaz v. Pan American World Airways:' the practice
must be reasonably necessary to the essence of the business (in
this case safe transportation). The greater the safety factor,
measured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of
that harm in case of an accident, the more stringent may be the
job qualifications designed to insure safety.65
The second step was a test adapted from the Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co." standard: whether
the airline "had reasonable cause, that is a factual basis, for
believing that all or substantial all [female flight attendants who
achieve certain certain stages of pregnancy] would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved or
whether it is impossible or impractical to deal with [such persons] on an individual basis." 7
Using this standard, the court held that National could not
require leave during the first 13 weeks; that the decision to quit
during the 13th to 20th weeks was to be determined on an individual basis; and that the airline could require an attendant to
go on leave after the 20th week. The court found that at the
20th week, changes in the muscle and skeletal system occurred
as well as an increase in girth which would make it increasingly
difficult for the attendant to work.
Recently, in Burwell v. EasternAirlines,58 the court divided
the pregnancy into segments as was done in National.The lower
court decision looked to both business necessity and a bona fide
" This is an example of the influence of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).

This portion of the test comes from Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,
531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 235.
5 458 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1978), rev'd in part. affd in part, 633 F.2d 361
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 49 U.S.L.W. 3636 (March 2, 1981).
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occupational qualification. Eastern argued that business necessity required the mandatory leave policy if the airline was to
meet its two objectives: protecting the health and welfare of the
flight attendant and her unborn children and the safety of its
passengers. As in National, the court ruled that the first was
not a proper consideration of the airline as its business is transportation, not maternity care. The second objective, although
sufficiently necessary to override discriminatory impact, was
not implemented in the least restrictive manner.
The court agreed that after the 28th week of pregnancy all
the requirements of a BFOQ were met: leave is reasonably necessary to the essence of business; the airline had a factual basis
for believing that substantially all persons in the class would be
unable to perform the job safely and efficiently; it is impossible
to deal with such persons on an individualized basis. Prior to
this time the following schedule applied:
1-12 weeks: the decision to continue to fly rests exclusively with
the flight attendant and her doctor.
13-20 weeks: the airline may condition flying on monthly permission by the doctor.
20-28 weeks: the airline may condition flying on weekly permission by the doctor. If between the 13th and 28th weeks job
performance is below par, the airline may take necessary
action.
after 28 weeks: the airline may require leave.
This policy was modified on appeal. In a per curiam opinion,
a majority of the court approved the policy for the first 13
weeks, reversed on the 13th to 28th weeks, saying the airline
could properly forbid flight on the basis of passenger safety, and
affirmed for the weeks after the 28th.
The decisions in these various cases have been based on
similar evidence, yet different conclusions have been drawn in
nearly every case. Although they cannot be reconciled, a pattern
does evolve.
Safe transportation has been the focus in all the airline
cases. While the duties of a flight attendant might appear to be
primarily serving food and reassuring passengers, the courts
and the airlines agree that the most important function of a
stewardess is passenger safety. The courts have difficulty in
determining how pregnancy hinders, if at all, the performance of
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these safety functions because so few air emergencies have occurred involving pregnant flight attendants. Northwestern,
which had adopted the most liberal policy, can provide little
helpful information. Perhaps this more than anything else explains why courts have reached such varying results when hearing virtually the same evidence in some cases. No one can be
sure that a pregnant flight attendant will be able to perform
emergency duties, and because the very lives of the passengers
are at stake, the courts are hesitant to allow pregnant attendants to fly and put the attendants' ability to test.
B. Teacher Cases
Teachers have been similarly active in litigating pregnancy
discriminaton. Suit was brought under due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution until 1972 when Title VII
was made applicable to educational institutions. The LaFleur
case determined that broadly sweeping maternity leave policies
were unconstitutional, but it left unresolved the possibility that
more reasonable regulations were permissible.
DeLaurierv. San Diego School Districtinvolved just such a
regulation.5 9 In that case the court upheld a mandatory leave
policy which required a pregnant teacher to go on leave following her eighth month of pregnancy. The court cited classroom
continuity, finding qualified substitutes and the declining ability
of teachers to perform their duties as reasons why such a policy
was justified as a BFOQ and business necessity. The court of appeals' upheld the decision stating that the policy was necessary
to the administrative and educational objectives of the school
district. The difficulty of finding qualified substitutes if such
policy were abandoned was great enough to qualify as a business necessity. The court also ruled that it could not say the
trial judge erred when he concluded that the ability of the
teacher to perform her duties declined as the date of delivery
approached.
Another teacher case, Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of
8 2 has yet
Pickens County School District,
to be resolved. The
10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 361 (S.D. Cal. 1974).
588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978).
" 599 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1979).
51
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original district court opinion held that there was a prima facie
violation of Title VII and held that a BFOQ did not exist for excluding pregnant teachers from working. The court pointed out
that many teachers were able to teach for the greater portion of
their pregnancy. This decision was later withdrawn in light of
General Electric Company v. Gilbert," handed down by the
United States Supreme Court. The Mitchell court found for the
school board concluding that the discrimination was not gender
based in treatment or in effect. The court of appeals, in reviewing the decision, found the district court's original finding of a
prima facie violation of Title VII was correct. It then remanded
on the issue of business necessity, stating the record was incomplete.
Two other cases, while not specifically mentioning business
necessity or bona fide occupational qualifications, struck down
mandatory maternity leave policies. Singer v. Mahoning" found
that "when a woman is compelled to take maternity leave of
absence because of pregnancy and where such person is capable
of performing her job adequately, that to force maternity leave
upon her is a violation of the Equal Employment Opportunities
Act of 1972, and is discrmination based upon a physical condition
peculiar to her sex."" The court in Fabianv. Independent School
District" ruled that the alleged reason of "continuity of education" is"no reason at all" to require mandatory leave three
months prior to delivery. Such a rule is not based on valid or
reasonably necessary grounds.
Mandatory unpaid leave was also the subject of Byrd v.
Unified School DistrictNo. 1,"6 in which the court struck down
the school board's two policies. One allowed a day of paid leave
to males to attend a birth or adoption. The other did not allow a
female teacher to take any paid leave time while on pregnancy
leave. Thus a benefit was granted to male teachers which female
teachers could never enjoy, and Title VII was violated.
The attitude of the court in Byrd reflects the attitude em429 U.S. 125 (1976).

379 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ohio 1974), affd, 519 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1975).
379 F. Supp. at 989.
409 F. Supp. 94 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
453 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
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bodied in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Under the act, the
cases cited which upheld mandatory unpaid leave would be in
violation if other temporary disabilities were treated differently. Such was the case in Somers v. Aldine Independent School
67
District,
where the court compared temporary disability policies of males with pregnancy and concluded the act was violated
as no mandatory leave was required of disabled males.
These cases show the courts are reluctant to put the decision whether to work in the hands of the pregnant woman. Although, in some instances the courts are willing, even eager, to
strike down broadly sweeping policies, the narrower the policy
is the more likely the courts are to uphold it. In virtually every
case involving the airlines the courts agreed that at some point
leave could be required. And while the court in Fabian v. Ind
School Dist." struck down a leave after the sixth month of pregnancy, the court in DeLaurierv. San Diego School Dist.9 upheld
one after the eighth.
Shouldn't the mother be able to determine for herself and
her baby what is best? The courts' answer is yes, generallybut not always. In the next section the courts' determination in
cases of hiring discrimination will be applied in the pregnancy
context. While the result seems to favor the mother, the employer still retains the right to refuse a job to her in certain
areas.

IV.

THE

BFOQ AND BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE IN
FUTURE PREGNANCY HIRING CASES

The previous cases involve areas which arguably have
special concerns. But what about a job without such concerns.
Can an employer make the "average" employee go on leave
when she wants to continue to work and her doctor has given
his permission? If she knocks on the door of a prospective
employer may he turn her away because she is pregnant? When
can an employer claim that a bona fide occupational qualification
or that a business necessity allows him to refuse to hire a pregnant woman?
464 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
409 F. Supp. 94 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 361 (S.D. Cal. 1974).
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Some guidance is given in the cases that follow. For instance, an employer may not refuse to hire a woman (pregnant
or not) for a position because he thinks it is too "strenuous."
0
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph"
clearly addresses this question. "Labeling a job 'strenuous' simply does
not meet this burden of proving that the job is within the bona
fide occupational qualification exception."71 Weeks also decided
that the employer's concern that a woman would be called out
after midnight and exposed to danger did not justify a policy of
hiring only males. "Title VII rejects just this type of romantic
paternalism as unduly Victorian and instead vests individual
women with the power to decide whether or not to take on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right to determine
whether the incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous,
dangerous, obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks is worth the
candle." 2
Could the employer refuse to hire a pregnant woman on the
grounds that the type of work she would be required to do
would be harmful to the fetus? That argument was not well
received in the airline cases, nor has it been in other instances.
The Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade holds the Constitution's right of prvacy is "broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."7
It would therefore seem broad enough to allow her to decide
what risks of harm she is willing to take during the pregnancy.
In Vick v. Texas Employment Commission,' the Court directly
addressed this question.
The court reads the statute (Title VII) and its interpretive and
related case authorities to at once extend to the female meaningful equality of job opportunity, to place upon the individual
female in greater measure, the moral responsibility for the
risks she takes in terms of vital procreation, and to balance the
matter with a due consideration of the realities of the business
enterprise involved.75
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
" Id. at 234.
Id. at 236.
,' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
70

'

6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 411 (S.D. Tex. 1973).

Id. at 416.
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A slightly different view is set out by Larson in his treatise
7
on Employment Discrimination:
It is elementary that the element of risk to one's self or to
others in the doing of a job is a factor bearing on a person's
ability or disability in relation to that job. In workmen's compensation it is firmly established that a worker is disabled if,
although he can perform his job, he can do so only at the risk of
endangering his own safety or health. If the element of risk to
one's own safety is so substantial a component of disability as to
entitle the worker to wage-loss benefits, a fortiori it is substantial enough to establish a difference in ability to qualify for a
particular job, under the bona fide occupational qualification.
Larson seems to think that if a pregnant woman could perform
the job but the risk of harm is substantial so that she would be
eligible for disability benefits, then the employer may raise the
BFOQ defense.
When the employment position involves a risk of harm to
another, sex or sex-related characteristics have been considered
BFOQ's. This risk of harm was the underlying reason for mandatory leave in the airline cases. In Dothard v. Rawlinson" the
United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether being male was a BFOQ for the position of prison guard at a
maximum security prison. The Court noted that "in the usual
case the argument that a particular job is too dangerous for
women may appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the
purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make that
choice for herself." 78 In this case, however, the Court determined
the choice was not up to the woman, and that her ability to
maintain order could be "directly reduced by her womanhood."
The BFOQ argument was upheld.
Similarly, in Roller v. City of San Mateo,79 the court in
deciding another issue, noted it would be "unsafe" and "physically ill-advised" for a pregnant police officer to continue her patrol
duties. Both Dothard and Roller involved cases where the
primary duties of the employee were to protect others and pro-

71 1 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §

16.20.

433 U.S. 321 (1977).
78Id. at 335.
399 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 572 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1977).
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mote safety-jobs which are difficult to perform effectively
when one is in the vulnerable position of being pregnant.
Dothard, however, does not have blanket application. It has
been distinguished in two cases: Gunther v. Iowa State Men's
Reformatory" and Manley v. Mobile County, Alabama." Gunther points out,
the balancing test of Dothard would seem applicable to all
prison contexts. However, the probabilities of sexual assaults
on female correction officers at Anamosa [a medium security
prison] and the potential impact on prison discipline and
rehabilitation opportunities is not of the degree as would warrant an exception to Title VII's proscription.... In balancing
the plaintiffs rights against institutional stability-an important and legitimate goal-the Supreme Court has mandated
that courts and administrative bodies weigh probabilities of instability. In Dothard the balance tipped toward recognizing a
BFOQ. In this case it tips toward recognition of plaintiffs
rights.'
Manley, which involved a county jail, agreed and said it is a
woman's choice to be employed in a dangerous environment as
long as the situation did not rise to the level in Dothard.Manley
also noted that a disabled man was given auxiliary duties during
emergencies-an alternative which should be available to a
female employee who lacked the physical ability required in
some emergencies.
Even if no safety factors are involved, an employer may
rightly question the physical ability of a pregnant woman to perform the job. He may require the woman to take and pass certain tests to determine her capabilities.
If he does not require testing, but refuses to hire the woman
because he believes she cannot adequately perform, his refusal
may be taken as evidence of his bad faith. Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc.' addressed this question. That case involved a woman
who sought a position of "Customer Service Agent" which in462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
441 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ala. 1977).
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 955 (N.D.
Iowa 1979).
83

500 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974).
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volved the loading and unloading of baggage and cargo. The
court stated:
Where the only basis in the record for finding a male more
qualified than a female are factors directly relatable to sexthe attributed capacity to lift bigger boxes-then we aren't at
all certain that a fact finding of non-discrimination can stand
when no objective tests were given to either applicant to determine physical abilities to perform the job in question."
Long v. Sapp" echoed this idea in a case involving unloading
of box cars. "If sex is not a BFOQ an employer must afford
every applicant who desires it, a reasonable opportunity to
demonstrate his or her ability to perform the tasks required of
the position sought."8 Long recognized the Weeks exception
that testing would not be required where it was impossible or
impractical to deal with persons on an individual basis."
If the employer does agree to test, the test must be "professionally developed" and not designed or intended to discriminate because of race, color, religion or sex." It cannot be a
"homemade" test." It must be job-related and validated." If a
pregnant woman cannot pass a test the employer is under no
obligation to hire her. An employer may "refuse to employ a
female on a particular job where under the facts of the particular case, the individual female employee lacks the necessary
physical and mental capacity to safely and efficiently perform
the task involved.9 As Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.9 points
out, Title VII demands "equal footing" for men and women and
this can be achieved by excluding a person from a job "only
upon a showing of individual incapacity."
If the position is one which is not amenable to objective
Id. at 166.
13502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974).
"Id. at 40.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph, 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1969).

' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
" Ste Marie v. Eastern RR Ass'n, 458 F. Supp. 1147, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 912 (5th Cir. 1973).
9

Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1097 (S.D. Ohio 1971),

rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972).
444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
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testing, subjective standards must be used. "[Tihe courts recognize that hiring decisions often cannot realistically be made on
the basis of objective standards alone ...

and that a subjective

reason for failure to hire a person should be given consideration
in rebutting charges of discrimination."93 These subjective
criteria are considered suspect, however, as they can mask unconscious discrimination,94 and like objective criteria must be job
related. 5 If the subjective factors result in disparate treatment,
good faith is no defense.
An employer may also require an employee to submit to a
medical exam if the exam bears a substantial relation to the adequacy of job performance. 7 As was seen in the airline cases, the
employer may also require permission from the employee's doctor to continue working. However, a problem might arise if no
such permission were required of other employees who were
also temporarily disabled. 8
What if the pregnant woman applies for a job which requires a training period which the employee must complete to
be accepted for the position? Spurlock v. United Airlines" which
involved the training of airline pilots says when the cost of a
training program is high, the importance of potential employees
finishing is great. In these circumstances, a business necessity
may be established which would exclude persons with a likelihood of failing to complete the training program. If a woman
was far enough along in her pregnancy so that she would have
to leave the program before she completed it, a business necessity might be justified.
Spurlock goes on to say that courts will closely examine any
pre-employment standard when the job requires a small amount
of skill and the consequences of hiring someone who is unqualified are insignificant. In these cases the employer has a

Rogillio v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 446 F. Supp. 423, 430 (S.D.
Tex. 1977).
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
'5

458 F. Supp. at 1162.

Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 557 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Dorcus v. Westvaco Corp., 345 F. Supp. 1173 (W.D. Va. 1972).
29 C.F.R. § 1604 app. question 6 (1980).
475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
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heavy burden of showing the job-relatedness of the requirement.
The burden is much less when the job requires a high degree of
skill." Spurlock has been cited in two other cases: Kinsey v.
First Regional Securities, Inc..1O1 and Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal,
Inc..l°2 These cases hold that cost of training alone is insufficient
to justify the continuation of an historical bias. In Kinsey the
training program was for security sales representatives. Spurlock did not apply, the court held, because public interest in
well-trained sales representatives was not paramount as was
the pilot training in Spurlock. Also the economic risk was not as
great in Kinsey.
Chrapliwy agreed that "dollar cost alone is an immaterial
consideration" but noted that if the cost of training was so great
as to cause a cut-back in operations resulting in current
employees losing their jobs, a business necessity could be sustained.
The employer must be careful in having a blanket "no hire"
policy for pregnant women. If there are no special concerns the
employer is most likely in violation of Title VII. If the position is
for a jockey, an acrobat or an astronaut, the employer is no
doubt safe in having such a policy. Each of these positions requires physical ability which a pregnant women obviously lacks.
However, the line is fuzzier when the job is for veterinarian,
coach or stewardess.
In short, an employer may not simply refuse to hire a pregnant woman because he believes she should stay at home or because it is inconvenient for him. There must be some element
which takes the case out of an ordinary situation and gives it
special considerations. Public safety, ability to adequately perform the job and extremely high cost of training are some examples. Absent some special concern a no-hire policy is forbidden.
This area is an important one in which many questions are
unanswered. There is little case law for guidance. Perhaps one
reason is that it is so easy for an employer to mask his reason
11 Id. at 219.
557 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
.01
10.
458 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
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for not hiring a woman. As more cases concerning pregnancy
are heard, as seems likely since the passage of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, the courts can begin to define a woman's, as
well as an employer's, rights in a variety of job situations.
V.

CONCLUSION

Returning to the original question of whether the employer
was guilty of sex discrimination when he turned away the
woman with B-A-B-Y on her shirt, more information is needed
about both the woman and the job. If the circumstances are any
of those mentioned above, the employer may have a valid defense for refusing to hire the woman. If no special concerns are
involved and the woman can perform the major tasks of the job,
the employer has no defense. In any case, the best determination is one made on an individual basis. Whether a particular
pregnant woman can do a job or whether pregnant women in
general can do a particular job should be decided by weighing all
the facts and determining the best solution in each situation.
April L. Dowler
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